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Abstract
We study the impact of socio-economic status on enrollment and study decisions
in higher education. We use a discrete choice approach to distinguish between three
channels. First, students from disadvantaged backgrounds may be more sensitive to
the costs of education. Second, they may have lower preferences for education. Third,
they may have developed less academic ability during previous schooling and are there-
fore less likely to participate. We apply our analysis to Flanders, where tuition fees
are low and all high school graduates have access to higher education. We control
for unobserved heterogeneity and nd that preference and (acquired) ability are more
important than cost sensitivity in explaining the lower enrollment of disadvantaged stu-
dents. Finally, we use the cost sensitivity channel to simulate the impact of tuition fee
increases. We nd that a uniform tuition fee increase has a fairly small impact on total
enrollment, but it especially reduces enrollment of socially disadvantaged students. An
alternative discriminatory policy, which combines a tuition fee increase with an extra
subsidy to disadvantaged students, can be superior: it reduces the participation gap of
disadvantaged students without decreasing total enrollment in higher education.
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1 Introduction
Governments aim to ensure a high participation of students in higher education. However,
there is a large gap in enrollment between students from disadvantaged backgrounds and
students from advantaged backgrounds. For many OECD countries, Asplund et al. (2004)
show that enrollment rates di¤er substantially according to the educational degree of the
parents. Bailey and Dynarski (2011) show for the U.S. that overall participation in higher
education has increased over time, but that this increase was smaller for low-income fami-
lies. As college graduates on average earn higher wages, children from low-income families
can improve their socio-economic status by investing in higher education. To increase the
participation of these students, governments implement nancial aid programs1 and provide
scholarships for low-income students.
We study the impact of socio-economic status on enrollment and study decisions in higher
education. We use a discrete choice model to distinguish between three channels through
which socio-economic status inuences enrollment and study decisions. First, students from
disadvantaged backgrounds may participate less in higher education because they are more
sensitive to the costs of education. Second, they may be less likely to enroll because of lower
preferences for education. This preference e¤ect captures the fact that disadvantaged stu-
dents have lower tastes for education, higher indirect costs of studying or lower expectations
about the returns of the investment. Third, students from disadvantaged backgrounds have
lower (acquired) academic ability when they graduate from high school. Academic ability
is an important determinant of study decisions and is also inuenced by socio-economic
background, as shown by Dahl and Lochner (2012) and Lundborg et al. (2014).
We apply our analysis to Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, where tuition fees
are low and institutions are not allowed to set their own admission standards. All high school
graduates can choose almost any program in higher education. This unique setting allows us
to observe the most preferred option of each student since choices are hardly constrained.
Students can choose between academic and professional programs. Academic programs are
o¤ered at universities and colleges, while professional programs are only o¤ered at colleges.
We use a unique dataset about all high school graduates of 2008, eligible to enter higher
education in Flanders. We combine this dataset with a dataset of all students in higher
education. We observe gender, age, high school background and socio-economic status. We
measure the socio-economic status of the student by the following variables: educational
degree of the mother, study grant in secondary education and language spoken at home.
1Deming and Dynarski (2009) review experimental and quasi-experimental research evidence on the causal
relationship between college costs and educational attainment. They nd that well-designed nancial aid
programs increase the participation in higher education.
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The study grant variable is our proxy for household income because low-income families
obtain a subsidy for children in secondary education. We also observe detailed information
on the students locations, from which it is possible to compute travel costs to all study
options (the sum of transport costs and the opportunity cost of travel time to attend a
professional or academic program).
We proceed with our analysis in several steps. We rst estimate the discrete choice model
to uncover the determinants of study choice, in particular socio-economic background. We
then use the parameter estimates to quantify the relative importance of the above three
channels through which socio-economic background may inuence enrollment in higher edu-
cation. Finally, we perform policy counterfactuals to investigate the e¤ects of raising tuition
fees. We distinguish between uniform tuition fees for all students, and discriminatory fees
to advantaged students, accompanied with subsidies to disadvantaged students. We discuss
the results from these steps in turn.
First, the empirical results from our discrete choice model reveal the following. Students
from disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to enroll in higher education. If they partici-
pate, they are more likely to choose for one-cycle, professional programs at college. Students
with less favorable socio-economic characteristics are also more sensitive to the costs of edu-
cation. There is also signicant unobserved heterogeneity, both regarding student sensitivity
to travel costs and regarding the preferences of studying (relative to not enrolling). These
factors are often neglected in previous studies, but turn out to be relevant for our further
analysis.
We next use the parameter estimates to quantify the impact of the three channels through
which socio-economic background inuences enrollment in higher education. We do this by
predicting study decisions of disadvantaged students as if this group would have similar
characteristics as the advantaged students. We nd that the preference and especially the
(acquired) ability e¤ects are more important in explaining the lower participation of dis-
advantaged students than the cost sensitivity e¤ect. According to the most general mixed
logit model (which captures heterogeneity in both travel cost sensitivity and preferences
for studying), relaxing the three e¤ects together would increase total enrollment in higher
education by 8.4 percentage points (from 69.9% to 78.3%). Relaxing the (acquired) ability
and preference e¤ects would increase participation by respectively 6.5 and 1.8 percentage
points, while relaxing the cost sensitivity e¤ect leads to an increase in participation of only
0.4 percentage points. Note that the decomposition gives similar results in the nested logit
(which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for studying, but not in travel
cost sensitivity). In contrast, the conditional logit model (which does not account for unob-
served heterogeneity) predicts a much larger cost sensitivity e¤ect. This demonstrates the
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importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity to obtain unbiased results. Because
in our most general mixed logit model the cost sensitivity e¤ect only explains a small part
of the participation gap, we conclude that policies to improve academic ability will be more
e¤ective than nancial incentives to increase the participation of disadvantaged students.
Finally, we use the model to evaluate the e¤ect of tuition cost increases on enrollment.
Tuition costs currently only cover approximately 3% of the total costs of higher education
in Flanders (Cantillon et al., 2006), and there is increasing pressure to raise tuition fees.
It is thus highly relevant to assess the impact of tuition fee increases on enrollment. We
nd that a 1000 euro tuition fee increase that is uniform to all students would reduce par-
ticipation by 3.0 percentage points for disadvantaged students, and by only 1.9 percentage
points for advantaged students. We therefore consider alternative discriminatory tuition fee
policies, which raise tuition fees by 1000 euro for advantaged students, combined with a
budget-neutral subsidy increase for disadvantaged students. Such a policy would leave total
enrollment more or less unchanged, and reduce the gap between both socio-economic groups:
enrollment of disadvantaged students would increase (+3.0 percentage points) at the expense
of a reduction in enrollment of advantaged students (-1.9 percentage points).
Our work relates to various strands in the literature on the e¤ects of socio-economic
status and nancial aid on enrollment in higher education. A rst strand of the literature
focusses on the impact of socio-economic status on enrollment. Family income, parental
education and race are important determinants of the participation decision, see for example
Steiner and Wrohlich (2012), Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), Frenette (2006) and Cameron
and Heckman (2001)2. Most studies nd that e¤ect of socio-economic status on enrollment
in higher education decreases when controlling for academic ability developed during previ-
ous schooling, see for example Baert and Cockx (2013) and Galindo-Rueda et al. (2004)3.
Consistent with our ndings, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) conclude that the long run ef-
fects associated with socio-economic status, such as cognitive and noncognitive ability, are
more important than credit constraints in explaining the participation gap. Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner (2003) suggest that family background is more important than the direct
costs of education in explaining the di¤erence in college outcomes by family income.
2Steiner and Wrohlich (2012) nd signicant e¤ects of family income and the educational degree of
the mother on the probability of choosing for university. Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) nd that a 10
percent increase in family income is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in the probability of attending
a four-year college. Frenette (2006) demonstrates that students from lower-income families are particularly
disadvantaged by distance in their enrollment decision. Cameron and Heckman (2001) nd that minorities
are less likely than whites to attend college.
3Baert and Cockx (2013) demonstrate that the ethnic gap in participation in tertiary education is elimi-
nated when controlling for family background and previous schooling. Galindo- Rueda et al. (2004) conclude
that much of the impact from social class on university attendance actually occurs well before entry into
higher education.
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A second strand of the literature focusses on the impact of nancial incentives on enroll-
ment. Financial aid programs increase the number of students in higher education. Corn-
well et al. (2006) demonstrate that Georgias HOPE program, a merit based scholarship,
increased freshmen enrollment by 5.9%. Abraham and Clark (2006) and Dynarski (2002 and
2003) nds that a $ 1000 increase in study grants increases participation by approximately 4
percentage points. Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010), Nielsen et al. (2010) and Steiner and
Wrolich (2012) nd much smaller e¤ects of study grants on participation. They conclude
that a 1000 euro increase in subsidies increases participation by about 1 to 1.5 percentage
points. While tuition fee subsidies have a small e¤ect on the participation decision, Kelchter-
mans and Verboven (2010) and Goodman (2008) nd that they have a stronger e¤ect on
where and what to study.
Our contribution is to combine both literatures and systematically evaluate the relative
importance of the above three channels through which socio-economic status can inuence
enrollment in higher education. Based on these ndings we can then focus on the cost sensi-
tivity channel to simulate the e¤ect of additional tuition fees and subsidies to disadvantaged
students.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an institutional
overview of the higher education system in Flanders, and takes a rst look at the rich register
data, describing rst-year enrollment and socio-economic background. Section 3 sets up the
empirical model and describes the assumptions of the three discrete choice models. Finally,
section 4 discusses the empirical results and quanties the impact of socio-economic status
on study decisions. Section 5 describes the impact of tuition fees on enrollment in higher
education.
2 Higher education in Flanders
We start with a description of higher education in Flanders. We only discuss institutional
aspects that are relevant for the rest of the paper4. We introduce our dataset and provide some
descriptive statistics of study decisions of high school graduates. These statistics already
illustrate the importance of socio-economic status on study decisions in higher education.
4Dassen and Luijten-Lub (2007) and De Ro (2008) provide more detailed information about education in
Flanders.
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2.1 Institutional overview
Flanders5 is the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, located in the North. It consists of about
60% of the population of 11 million inhabitants, compared with 40% in the French-speaking
part, which is located in the South and most of Brussels6. Because of the di¤erent languages,
both higher education systems are quite closed systems, with only a limited number of
students attending universities and colleges in the other region. Nevertheless, because of
their long common history, both the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking educational
system are quite comparable in terms of enrollment policies.
All undergraduate higher education institutions in Flanders are public (Kelchtermans
and Verboven, 2010). There are no entry barriers in higher and all high school graduates
are allowed to start at all programs in higher education, regardless of their specic high
school degree (Cantillon and Declercq, 2012)7. This leads to low success rates in the rst
year in higher education and many students drop out or switch to another program after the
rst year of study (Declercq and Verboven, 2014). Tuition fees are low (approximately 600
euro8 in academic year 2013-2014) and cover only 3% of the total costs of higher education
(Cantillon et al., 2006). Students can receive a scholarship if the income of the parents is
below a certain threshold. The amount of the subsidy depends on the income of the parents.
In contrast to other countries such as the U.K., there is no study loan system in Belgium.
Most parents pay for the higher education studies of their children9.
The implementation of the Bachelor Master structure in the academic year 2004-2005
changed the organization of higher education In Flanders. Bachelor and master programs10
are o¤ered at 2 types of institutions. Universities o¤er academic programs and colleges o¤er
both academic and professional programs. Academic programs consist of 2 cycles, a 3 year
bachelor program followed by a 1 or 2 year master program. Professional programs only
consist of a 3 year bachelor program. There are several university and college campuses in
Flanders.
5We only discuss institutional aspects that are relevant for the rest of the paper. Dassen and Luijten-Lub
(2007) and De Ro (2008) provide more detailed information about education in Flanders.
6A small minority of the Dutch-speaking part (about 10%) also lives in Brussels. There is also a small
German-speaking part in Belgium, located in the East (about 0.6% of the population).
7The government only imposes entry exams for a very limited number of programs, such as medicine and
dentistry at university.
8If the parentsincome is low, students pay a lower tuition fee of 100 euro.
9It is possible for students to get a living wage to cover the costs of living and studying. However, this
option is only available for students who have no access to other sources of nancing (POD Maatschappelijke
Integratie, 2014).
10Higher education institutions can also o¤er postgraduate programs, bridging programs, advanced master
programs and doctoral programs. In this paper, we only focus on enrollment of high school graduates in
academic and professional bachelor programs.
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2.2 A rst look at the data
We combine 2 rich datasets provided by the Flemish Ministry of Education and Training.
We observe gender, age, high school background and socio-economic status of all high school
graduates eligible for higher education in 2008. We also observe detailed information on the
studentslocations11, from which it is possible to compute travel costs to all study options.
We combine this dataset with a dataset of all students in higher education12.
In Table 1, we represent choices of the high school graduates of academic year 2007-
2008 in Flanders. A total of 57,586 pupils graduated from high school and were eligible to
start higher education. From these high school graduates, 69.8% actually enroll in higher
education: 23.8% start at university and respectively 8.3% and 37.8% choose for an academic
program or a professionally oriented program at college.
In the following rows of the table, we show that participation decisions di¤er according
to gender, age at graduation from high school, high school background and socio-economic
status. Males are less likely to participate in higher education: 65.4% of male high school
graduates continue studying, compared with 73.9% of the female high school graduates.
Males are also less likely to choose for university and professional college programs, but
are more likely to choose for academic college programs. Pupils who graduate from high
school without study delay, typically at the age of 18, are more likely to participate in higher
education (78.4% versus 51.1%). This e¤ect is strongest for academic programs, especially
at university (31.1% of the pupils without study delay start university, versus only 7.7% of
the students with a study delay).
High school background also plays a major role in the study decisions. There are 4
types of programs in secondary education: general secondary education, technical secondary
education, artistic secondary education and vocational secondary education. Programs in
general secondary education provide pupils with a theoretical background and prepare them
for higher education. In general secondary education, pupils can choose for various combi-
nations of mathematics, classical languages, sciences, economics, modern languages and/or
humanities. Programs in technical secondary education provide students with a theoretical
and technical background to prepare them for professional higher education or the labor
market. We aggregate the several programs in technical secondary education in 5 categories:
business, technical sciences, social-technical sciences, technics and all other programs. Pro-
11We observe the location of the students at the level of the statistical sector. In Belgium, each municipality
is divided into several statistical sectors.
12The student dataset contains information of all students who rst registered for a program in higher
education in 2008 or 2009. From the 57586 high school graduates, 39052 students start in higher education
in academic year 2008-2009, while another 1158 students do not immediately start in higher education after
graduating from high school but enter higher education with 1 year of delay.
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grams in artistic secondary education prepare pupils for a profession or higher education.
Programs in vocational secondary education prepare pupils for the labor market, but they
can also start at college or university13.
Pupils from general secondary education are most likely to participate in higher educa-
tion: 53.2% choose for university programs, 12.7% for academic college programs and 29.8%
for professional college programs. Only 4.3% of general high school graduates choose for the
drop-out option. Participation decisions di¤er between the several programs in general sec-
ondary education.14 Pupils graduating from programs in mathematics or classical languages
are most likely to start at university. Pupils graduating from technical secondary educa-
tion are most likely to choose for professional programs: 63.2% of graduates from technical
high schools start at a professional bachelor program, while only 3.5% start at university.
Again, study decisions di¤er between the several programs. Pupils from artistic programs
in secondary education also prefer to continue studying, while pupils graduating from voca-
tional secondary education are most likely to choose for the drop-out option. Only 13.5% of
graduates from vocational secondary education enrolls in higher education.
Finally, socio-economic status also inuences participation and study decisions. We mea-
sure the socio-economic status of the student by the following variables: educational degree
of the mother, language spoken at home, and the study grant in high school as a measure of
household income. The study grant variable is our proxy for household income because low-
income families obtain a scholarship for children in secondary education. The educational
degree of the mother has an important e¤ect on study decisions. The higher the educational
degree of the mother, the higher the participation rates. If the mother has a degree in higher
education, 40.2% of the students choose for a program at university, while only 9.6% do so if
the mother has not nished secondary education. This gap is smaller for academic programs
at college and has disappeared for professional programs at college. Pupils who speak Dutch
at home are more likely to participate in higher education. This e¤ect is similar for all
options in higher education. Students from low-income families are less likely to participate
in higher education: 25.8% of the high-income students start at university, compared with
only 16.1% of the low-income students. However, low-income students are proportionally
more represented at professional bachelor programs at college.
13Pupils who graduate from vocational secondary education have to complete an extra year of high school
before they are allowed to enroll for programs in higher education.
14We aggregate similar programs in general and technical secondary education into the options represented
in table 1.
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Table 1: Enrollment in higher education
Characteristics university acad college prof college total
All pupils 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
Gender
male 21.5 10.2 33.8 65.4
female 25.9 6.5 41.5 73.9
Age
no study delay 31.1 9.5 37.8 78.4
study delay 7.7 5.6 37.8 51.1
High school background
general HS 53.2 12.7 29.8 95.7
clas + math 84.0 7.0 5.6 96.6
clas + lang 69.9 10.7 14.9 95.5
sci + math 66.2 16.5 13.8 96.5
math + lang 48.4 15.5 31.1 95.0
econ + math 53.6 19.3 24.1 97.0
econ + lang 28.5 15.8 51.1 95.4
human 29.3 6.6 58.6 94.5
technical HS 3.5 5.8 63.2 72.5
business 5.0 4.9 76.9 86.8
sci + tech 9.5 22.4 59.5 91.4
social + tech 2.2 2.4 81.9 86.5
technics 0.6 3.8 46.7 51.2
other tech 2.9 2.9 57.4 63.2
artistic HS 9.5 37.0 39.9 86.4
vocational HS 0.3 0.6 12.7 13.5
Socio economic background
mother no SE degree 9.6 4.5 35.7 50.2
mother SE degree 16.9 7.3 41.6 34.2
mother HE degree 40.2 11.7 34.9 13.2
dutch at home 23.9 8.3 38.1 29.6
no dutch at home 21.3 7.1 31.8 39.8
study grant in HS 16.1 7.0 40.0 36.9
no study grant in HS 25.8 8.6 37.2 28.4
Total 13691 4760 21759 17376
Note: Percentage of high school graduates of 2008 who choose for each option, based on own calculations
From Table 1, we see that students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds are less
likely to participate in higher education. This e¤ect is strongest for two-cycle, academic
bachelor programs at university. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) provide two possible expla-
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nations for the low participation of these students. The rst interpretation is that students
from low-income families are credit constrained and invest less in education. Their second
interpretation emphasizes the long-run factors associated with socio-economic background.
Socio-economic status inuences childrens preferences for education and ability. Better fam-
ily resources stimulate the cognitive and noncognitive skills of children. Dahl and Lochner
(2012) and Lundborg et al (2014) show that respectively family income and parental educa-
tion signicantly a¤ect cognitive and non-cognitive skills of their children.
Table 2: Socio-economic status and high school outcomes
Characteristics disadvantaged background advantaged background
Age
no study delay 59.6 74.1
study delay 40.4 25.9
High school background
general HS 27.6 50.6
clas + math 3.0 8.4
clas + lang 2.5 5.2
sci + math 5.3 12.6
math + lang 2.3 4.5
econ + math 1.7 2.9
econ + lang 6.8 9.4
human 5.9 7.7
technical HS 36.8 32.8
business 8.7 6.6
sci + tech 3.6 4.3
social + tech 5.5 5.1
technics 8.4 7.3
other tech 10.6 9.5
artistic HS 2.2 2.2
vocational HS 33.5 14.4
Total 21,755 35,831
Note: High school outcomes are expressed as a percentage of high school graduates. High
school outcomes add up to 100% for age and high school background type (general,
technical, artistic, vocational). Within the rst two types (general and technical),
we also distinguish between specic program.
In Table 2, we provide evidence for the second explanation of Carneiro and Heckman
(2002). We nd that high school outcomes di¤er according to their socio-economic status.
10
We split the sample of high school graduates in two groups according to socio-economic
background. We dene a student as coming from a socially disadvantaged background if he
or she satised at a minimum one of the following criteria: the mother has no degree in at
least secondary education; the language spoken at home is not Dutch; or a study grant was
granted in secondary school.
Students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to graduate from high
school without study delay. Only 59.6% of disadvantaged students graduate without delay,
while 74.1% of the other students graduate at the age of 18. Students from socially disad-
vantaged backgrounds are also less likely to graduate from programs in general secondary
education that prepare students for higher education. Only 27.6% of students from socially
disadvantaged backgrounds graduate from general secondary education, while 50.6 of ad-
vantaged students graduate from a general high school program. This gap is even larger in
high school programs that focus on mathematics, classical languages or sciences. Students
with a lower level of socio-economic capital are twice as likely to graduate from vocational
secondary education. Declercq and Verboven (2014) show that high school background is an
important determinant of study decisions and success in higher education.
3 Empirical analysis
From the descriptive statistics, we see that socio-economic status is correlated with study
decisions in higher education. Socio-economic status also determines previous schooling and
therefore study decisions in higher education. In our empirical analysis, we allow for the
following three channels through which socio-economic status can inuence enrollment in
higher education:
1. Sensitivity to the costs of higher education: Disadvantaged students are less likely to
enroll in higher education because they are more sensitive to the costs of education.
2. Preferences for higher education: Disadvantaged students are less likely to enroll be-
cause they have lower tastes for education or lower expectations about the returns.
3. Academic ability: Disadvantaged students are less likely to enroll because they have
less favorable high school outcomes.
We use a discrete choice approach to analyze the impact of these channels on enrollment
and study decisions. We model both the choice between the type of program and the campus.
First, we specify the equation for the utility of studying and the equation for the costs of ed-
ucation. Then, we estimate three discrete choice models: a conditional logit model, a nested
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logit model and a random coe¢ cients model, where we allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in preferences and cost sensitivity and unrestricted substitution patterns.
3.1 Utility of studying
After graduating from high school, students can choose to continue education or to start
working. A student i chooses an option j 2 J , with J the set of choice alternatives to
maximize the utility of studying. The utility of studying Uij depends on gender and high
school background Xi, socio-economic background Si, and the costs of studying Cij and is
given by
Uij(Xi; Si; Cij) = ij + jXi + jSi + iCij + CijSi + "ij (1)
= Vij(Xi; Si; Cij) + "ij;
where Vij(Xi; Si; Cij) represents the deterministic part of utility and "ij represents the un-
observed factors a¤ecting the utility of studying. We allow for an individual alternative
specic constant term ij. This takes into account that students di¤er in unobserved pref-
erences for the several study options. Observed characteristics also inuence the utility of
studying. j measures the impact of gender and high school background Xi on the utility
of studying. Socio-economic status Si determines the preferences for education through j
(the second channel through which socio-economic status inuences study decisions). The
impact of socio-economic status di¤ers between the several options j. i measures the sen-
sitivity to the costs of education. Students are heterogeneous in their sensitivity to costs.
We test whether socio-economic status inuences the sensitivity to costs by interacting the
socio-economic variables with the cost variable.  measures the cost-e¤ect of socio-economic
status on enrollment (the third channel through which socio-economic status inuences study
decisions)
3.2 Costs of education
The costs for student i in option j are given by equation (2). They consist of the tuition
fee Fij, travel costs Tij; and the study grant received in higher education Gij. The costs are
given by
Cij = Fij + Tij(dij; tij; Rij) Gij: (2)
Tuition fees and study grants in higher education depend on household income. The
lower the household income, the higher the amount of the study grant. Students who receive
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a subsidy also have to pay a lower tuition fee15. We specify a similar travel cost function
as in Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) where travel costs Tij(dij; tij; Rij) depend on the
distance (dij) between the home municipality of the student and the college or university
campus, travel time tij and on the costs of going on residence Rij. The annual travel costs
for students who do not go on residence are given by
Tij = 75dij + 42tij: (3)
As in Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010), We assume that students make 10 trips during
30 weeks at a transportation cost of 0.25 euros/km and an opportunity cost of time of 8.36
euro/hour16. Students who go on residence, save a fraction  of the trips but pay an extra
annual cost on rent Rij. Students who obtain a study grant, pay lower rents. The cost of
going on residence is given by
Tij = Rij + (1  )(75dij + 42tij): (4)
In our dataset, we do not observe whether students decide to commute or go on residence.
Therefore, we assume that students go on residence if the costs of commuting exceed the
costs of going on residence17.
To compute the expected study grant Gij for all high school graduates, we face the
following two problems: First, we only observe whether a student obtains a study grant and
not the exact amount of the grant Gij: Second, we only observe the subsidy variable for
students who start in higher education and not for students who do not participate. This
implies that we need to impose some additional assumptions on the cost function to compute
the amount of the subsidy for both students and outsiders.
Nielsen, Sorensen and Taber (2010) and Lundborg et al (2014) face similar problems and
calculate the exact amount of the subsidy for students and outsiders based on the algorithm
that the authorities used to compute the grants. As we do not observe family income, we
assume that students who get a subsidy in higher education, obtain the average amount of
15In Flanders, tuition fees are already low (approximately 620 euro). Students who receive a scholarship
have to pay a tuition fee of only 104 euro.
16This corresponds to the typical wage for student jobs (Jobdienst KU Leuven).
17Estimates of the annual cost of going on residence are available for the university of Ghent (Sociale
dienst, UGent). Students without a study grant pay an annual rent of 3096 euro, while students with a
study grant pay an annual rent of only 1764 euro for a room o¤ered by the university. We assume that rental
prices are similar in other cities.
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the subsidy given in higher education. The average subsidy in academic year 2008-2009,
the year of our analysis, was 1726 euro for university programs and 1488 euro for college
programs18.
To predict the expected subsidy of non-participants, we use a dummy variable for whether
a student received a grant in high school as a measure of household income. Low-income
students obtain a subsidy in high school. We assume that pupils who choose for the drop-out
option would receive a subsidy in higher education if they already obtained a subsidy in high
school19. Again, we assume that they would obtain the average subsidy in higher education.
3.3 Estimation
We use a mixed logit model to estimate the e¤ect of socio-economic background on study
decisions and cost sensitivity. After graduating from high school, a student chooses an option
j 2 J to maximize utility, given by equation (1). We model the choice between the drop-
out option and 45 study alternatives in higher education. We dene a study option as a
type of program (university, academic college, professional college) at a specic campus. We
normalize the utility of the professional bachelor program at college to zero.
Random coe¢ cients or mixed logit models do not exhibit the independence from irrele-
vant alternatives assumption (Brownstone and Train, 1999). These models assume that "ij
is independently and identically type 1 extreme value distributed, but in addition allow for
unobserved heterogeneity regarding the other parameters, which creates exible substitution
patterns between options. We estimate the mean e¤ect of the variables and the standard
deviation around the mean. We specify the probability Pij that individual i chooses for
option j as follows
Pij =
Z 0@ eVij(Xi;Si;Cij)X
j02J
eVij0 (Xi;Si;Cij0 )
1A f()d; (5)
with f() the normal density function of the random coe¢ cients : In the notation of equation
(1),  includes ij and i because we allow for heterogeneity in preferences for the several
study options j and heterogeneity in the sensitivity to the costs of education. We assume
that the e¤ect of personal characteristics Xi; and socio-economic status Si is the same for
all students.
Given the size of our dataset, where 57,586 students choose between 46 options, it is
18The Flemish Ministry of Education and Training provides data about the total amount of subsidies in
higher education and the number of recipients. We computed the average subsidy in higher education.
19From the sample of participating students, we nd that obtaining a study grant in high school is a good
predictor of obtaining a study grant in higher education. The correlation between both is 72%.
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not computationally feasible to estimate the model with the full dataset. We therefore use
a random subsample of 30 percent of the students. As the choice probabilities, given by
equation (5), have no closed form solution, we estimate the model with maximum simulated
likelihood. We assume that the coe¢ cients are drawn from a normal density function f()
to generate 100 draws of the coe¢ cients for each student.
We also estimate two special cases of the mixed logit model. The rst simplication is
the conditional logit model. In this model, we do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity in
the valuation of the alternative-specic constants, i.e. ij = j in (1), and in the sensitivity
to costs, i.e. i = . The error term "ij is still independently and identically type 1 extreme
value distributed, but there is no other unobserved heterogeneity. The assumptions of this
model are discussed in Train (2009). The probability Pij that student i chooses option j 2 J
is then given by
Pij =
eVij(Xi;Si;Cij)X
j02J
eVij0 (Xi;Si;Cij0 )
: (6)
The independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption of the conditional logit model implies
that the unobserved factors of utility are uncorrelated across alternatives. Increasing the
utility of one option implies a proportional decrease in the probability of choosing for all
other alternatives.
The second simplication of the random coe¢ cients logit model is the nested logit model.
This model relaxes the independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption and allows for
more realistic substitution patterns. This model allows for correlation of the unobserved
factors "ij a¤ecting utility within each nest. Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) nd that
students perceive the higher education institutions and programs as close substitutes. We
therefore specify a nested logit model with two nests: a no-study nest and a study nest. The
study nest includes 45 study options in higher education. The no-study nest includes the
drop-out option. As in Train (2009), the probability Pijk that individual i chooses for option
j in nest Bk is given by the nested logit model (7).
Pijk =
e(Vij(Xi;Si;Cij)=)
X
j02Bk
e(Vij0 (Xi;Si;Cij0 )=)
 1
X2
n=1
X
j02Bn
e(Vij0 (Xi;Si;Cij0 )=)
 : (7)
The parameter  is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among
the alternatives in nest Bk. The nested logit model can be viewed as an intermediate model
between the other two models. On the one hand, the nested logit model is a generalization
of the conditional logit model because it allows tastes for the alternatives with the nests
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(study versus no-study) to be correlated. There is perfect correlation if  = 0, and there is
no correlation as in the conditional logit if  = 1. On the other hand, the nested logit is
less general than the mixed logit: it allows for correlation between alternatives of the same
nest, whereas the mixed logit allows for additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity in
particular the sensitivity to travel costs.
4 Empirical results
We rst discuss the estimation results of the three discrete choice models. We focus on the
results of the mixed logit model because this model takes into account unobserved hetero-
geneity and allows for less restrictive substitution patterns than the other models. Then,
we quantify the relative impact of the three channels through which socio-economic status
inuences enrollment in higher education.
4.1 Demand estimation
In Table 3, we present the results of the mixed logit model. The results of the conditional
logit and the nested logit model are shown in Table A1 and A2 in Appendix. A comparison
of the three models shows that unobserved heterogeneity is important, but the sign and
signicance levels of the other coe¢ cients do not di¤er much between the several models.
Our nested logit model in Table A2 is consistent with utility maximization for all possible
values of the explanatory variables because the estimated value of the nesting parameter 
is between 0 and 1 ( = 0:254 with a standard error of 0.021, implying strong correlation
of preferences for the study options relative to the no-study alternative). The nested logit
model also provides a better t of the data in terms of the log likelihood.20 In the remainder
of this section, we only describe the results of our mixed logit model because this model
takes into account unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and cost sensitivity in a more
exible way, allowing for less restrictive substitution patterns.
From the results of the mixed logit model in Table 3, we rst see that even after taking
into account a lot of observed heterogeneity, such as gender and high school background Xi
and socio-economic background Si; students signicantly di¤er in unobserved preferences for
the study options j. The standard deviations of the random coe¢ cients for the no-study
20We cannot compare the value of the reported log likelihood of the conditional logit and nested logit
models with the log likelihood of the mixed logit model because the mixed logit model is estimated on a
random sample of the data. However, when we compare the log likelihood of the mixed logit model with the
values of the log likelihood of a conditional logit model and a nested logit model on a random sample of the
same size, we see that the mixed logit model provides the best t of the data.
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option, for the university study options and for academic college study options are all highly
signicant. Gender and age signicantly a¤ect study decisions in higher education. Males are
more likely to choose for the non-study option relative to the reference category, a professional
bachelor program at college. However, males who participate in higher education prefer to
start at 2 cycle academic programs at college relative to 1 cycle professional programs at
college. Pupils who graduate from high school with some years of study delay are more likely
to choose for the drop-out option. If they decide to participate in higher education, they are
most likely to choose for 1 cycle professional bachelor programs at college.
High school background determines choices in higher education. Students graduating
from general, technical or artistic secondary education are less likely to choose for the drop-
out option compared to pupils from vocational secondary education. Students from programs
in general secondary education are most likely to choose for 2 cycle academic programs at
university or college. Students who studied mathematics, classical languages or sciences
in high school have the strongest preference for university. We also distinguish between
programs in technical secondary education. We nd that students who studied technical
sciences in high school prefer academic bachelor programs at college relative to professional
bachelor programs at college. Most graduates from technical secondary education prefer
academic or professional bachelor programs at college. We do not include interaction e¤ects
between programs in technical secondary education and university level programs, because
only few students from technical, artistic or vocational programs start at university. Pupils
graduating from artistic secondary education are most likely to choose for academic college
programs.
Socio-economic status signicantly determines study decisions after controlling for pre-
vious schooling. We measure the socio-economic status by the educational degree of the
mother, language spoken at home and a dummy for whether a pupil received a subsidy in
high school as a proxy for household income. A student whose mother has no degree in
higher education is more likely to choose for the drop-out option. The degree of the mother
also inuences choices in higher education. Students whose mother has no degree in higher
education are less likely to start at 2 cycle programs at college or university relative to pro-
fessional bachelor programs at college that consist of 1 cycle. This e¤ect is stronger if the
mother has no degree in secondary education. Pupils who do not speak Dutch at home are
more likely to choose for the drop-out option. However, if they participate in higher edu-
cation, they are more likely to choose for 2 cycle programs at university relative to 1 cycle
professional college programs. We also nd that household income determines the decision
to participate but not the choice between the several programs. Students whose household
income is below a certain threshold are more likely to choose for the drop-out option.
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Table 3: Random coe¢ cients model
no study option study options
universitya academic collegea
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant (j)
mean 5.659*** (0.768) -11.817*** (1.622) -13.013*** (1.737)
st. deviation 8.986*** (0.971) 8.652*** (1.058) 7.355*** (0.924)
Gender and high school background (j)
male 1.164*** (0.289) 0.239 (0.263) 2.497*** (0.370)
study delay 2.975*** (0.395) -1.538*** (0.390) -0.903*** (0.314)
general HSb
clas + math -16.311*** (2.154) 25.247*** (2.953) 9.401*** (1.189)
clas + lang -19.635*** (2.532) 19.880*** (2.376) 8.891*** (1.193)
sci + math -19.594*** (2.228) 20.106*** (2.336) 10.313*** (1.255)
math + lang -20.343*** (2.334) 14.491*** (1.785) 7.849*** (1.135)
eco + math -24.413*** (2.754) 17.246*** (2.101) 8.758*** (1.256)
eco + lang -22.895*** (2.484) 9.713*** (1.236) 6.725*** (0.992)
human -22.118*** (2.381) 10.368*** (1.317) 3.414*** (0.788)
technical HSb
business -20.157*** (2.133) - - 0.361 (0.671)
sci + tech -21.900*** (2.367) - - 7.341*** (1.102)
social + tech -18.728*** (1.995) - - -1.304 (0.856)
technics -10.714*** (1.158) - - 0.853 (0.700)
other tech -12.871*** (1.384) - - 1.152* (0.659)
artistic HSb -17.171*** (2.001) - - 12.219*** (1.576)
Socio-economic status (j)
mother no SE degreec 2.309*** (0.475) -2.864*** (0.522) -1.435*** (0.409)
mother SE degreec 1.455*** (0.370) -2.111*** (0.362) -0.833*** (0.286)
no dutch at home 2.243*** (0.540) 2.381*** (0.626) 1.613*** (0.564)
low income 0.766** (0.330) 0.214 (0.345) -0.150 (0.321)
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Base category = professional college program
b Base category = technical + artistic + vocational secondary education for university, vocational
secondary education for college
c Base category = mother has a degree in higher education
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Table 3 (continued): Random coe¢ cients model
Variables Coef. St. error
Cost sensitivity ()
constant
mean -0.944*** (0.015)
st. deviation 0.196*** (0.030)
Cost sensitivity and socio-economic status ()
mother no SE degreec -0.192*** (0.027)
mother SE degreec -0.134*** (0.019)
no dutch at home -0.151*** (0.049)
low income -0.341*** (0.030)
Log likelihood -37188.73
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c Base category = mother has a degree in higher education
Finally, students are sensitive to the costs of education and di¤er in their sensitivity to
costs. Furthermore, socio-economic status determines the sensitivity to the costs of edu-
cation. A student whose mother has no degree in secondary education or does not speak
Dutch at home is more sensitive to the costs of education. Low-income students are also
more sensitive to the costs of education.
We nd evidence for both interpretations of Carneiro and Heckman (2002) for the low
participation of students with weaker socio-economic characteristics. The rst interpretation
is that students from low-income families are credit constrained and invest less in education.
We nd that students with a lower level of socio-economic capital are indeed more a¤ected
by costs in their study decision. The second interpretation emphasizes the long-run e¤ects
of socio-economic background, such as preferences for education and acquired ability in high
school. We nd that socio-economic status has a direct impact on the utility of studying and
an indirect impact through high school outcomes. We will now move on to quantifying the
importance of these three channels.
4.2 Decomposition of the enrollment gap
Based on our previous results, we can now quantify the relative importance of the three
channels through which socio-economic background inuences enrollment in higher educa-
tion. We simulate the e¤ect of relaxing the impact of socio-economic status by predicting
study decisions of students as if the group of disadvantaged students would have similar
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characteristics as the advantaged students. As in Table 2, we dene a student as coming
from a socially disadvantaged background if his or her mother has no degree in secondary
education or the language spoken at home is not Dutch or the student obtained a subsidy in
secondary school. Students who received a subsidy in higher education have a low household
income.
In Table 4, we simulate how total enrollment in higher education would increase if dis-
advantaged students would have the same characteristics as advantaged students. We only
represent the outcomes of the mixed logit model. Outcomes of the conditional and nested
logit model are represented in table A3 in Appendix. To quantify the impact of the cost
and preference channel, we assume that the language at home and the subsidy in secondary
education have no e¤ect on enrollment. This is the case for the advantaged students. As the
group of advantaged students consists of both students with a mother with only a high school
degree and students with a mother with a degree in higher education, we cannot simply set
the e¤ect of the diploma of the mother to zero for disadvantaged students: we would then
overpredict the e¤ect of socio-economic status. We therefore randomly assign students of
disadvantaged backgrounds to one of these two groups according to the fraction of students
in the advantaged group.21 For example, 49% of the advantaged students has a mother with
only a high school degree and 51% has a mother with a degree in higher education. In our
simulation we then randomly give 49% of the disadvantaged students a mother with a high
school degree and 51% of the disadvantaged a mother with a degree in higher education. To
quantify the impact of the academic ability channel, we give students from disadvantaged
backgrounds the same favorable high school outcomes as the advantaged students. Again, we
randomly assign high school programs to disadvantaged students according to the fraction
of students in the advantaged group.
First, we simulate the e¤ect of separately relaxing the impact of the cost sensitivity chan-
nel. In this case, costs have the same impact on disadvantaged as on advantaged students.
Disadvantaged students still di¤er in preferences and academic ability from advantaged stu-
dents. The mixed logit model predicts that total enrollment would increase by 0.4 percentage
points. This increase in enrollment can be entirely attributed to an increase in enrollment
at college programs. Note that this cost sensitivity e¤ect is similar in the nested logit model
(0.5 percentage points), but much larger in the conditional logit model which does not allow
for any unobserved heterogeneity (+1.4 percentage points).
Second, we simulate the e¤ect of separately relaxing the impact of the preference channel.
21When randomly assigning more favourable characteristics to the disadvantaged students, the predicted
changes in enrollment di¤er slightly for every random draw of characteristics. Therefore, we repeated the
predictions 50 times and represent the average predicted increase in enrollment in table 4.
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Students from disadvantaged backgrounds then have the same preferences, indirect costs or
expectations as advantaged students. In this case, total enrollment would increase by 1.8
percentage points, again mainly because of more enrollment at professional college programs
(+1.1 percentage points). Results are similar in the nested logit model (+1.5 percentage
points) but again much larger in the conditional logit model which ignores unobserved het-
erogeneity (+4.7 percentage points).
Table 4: Decomposing the impact of socio-economic background
univ acad coll prof coll total
Observed choices 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
Status quo (mixed logit model) 23.6 8.4 37.9 69.9
Relaxing the impact of socio-economic background
Cost e¤ect +0.0 +0.0 +0.4 +0.4
Preference e¤ect +0.5 +0.3 +1.1 +1.8
Ability e¤ect +4.5 +1.1 +0.9 +6.5
All e¤ects +5.5 +1.4 +1.5 +8.4
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2008 high school graduates.
The e¤ects of the counterfactuals are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the predicted
choice probabilities.
Third, we simulate the e¤ect of separately relaxing the academic ability channel. We
give students from disadvantaged backgrounds similar high school outcomes as advantaged
students. We nd that total enrollment in higher education would increase by 6.5 percent-
age points. Interestingly, this e¤ect is now mainly due to higher enrollment at university
programs (+4.5 percentage points). Results are similar in the other two models.
Finally, we simulate the e¤ect of simultaneously relaxing the impact of all three channels.
We nd that total enrollment in higher education would increase by 8.4 percentage points,
half of which is due to a higher enrollment at universities. The nested logit model predicts a
similar increase of 8.6 percentage points, while the conditional logit model predicts a larger
increase of 10.9 percentage points. We conclude that academic ability (+6.5%) and prefer-
ences (+1.8%) are more important than costs (+0.4%) in explaining the participation gap
of disadvantaged students. These ndings are consistent with Carneiro and Heckman (2002)
who nd that long run family e¤ects, shaping academic ability and tastes for education, are
more important in explaining the low participation of students from socially disadvantaged
backgrounds than short term credit constraints.
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5 Policy counterfactuals
We can use the results on the cost sensitivity channel to simulate the impact of alternative
tuition fee policies. Tuition costs only cover approximately 3% of the total costs of higher
education in Flanders (Cantillon et al., 2006), and there is increasing pressure to raise tuition
fees in many countries to meet budgetary constraints. Some countries, such as the U.K.,
have recently already raised tuition fees to increase the private contribution to the total
costs of higher education. It is therefore highly relevant to assess the impact of tuition fee
increases on enrollment. In Table 5, we represent the predicted changes in enrollment of three
alternative tuition fee policies. We again only present the results of the mixed logit model
because this model allows for less restrictive substitution patterns. Results of the nested
logit model and the conditional logit model are shown in Table A4 and A5 in Appendix.
We rst simulate the impact of a uniform 1000 euro cost increase for all students in all
programs in higher education. Total enrollment in higher education would decrease by 2.3
percentage points. Participation of the students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds
would decrease by a higher amount of 3 percentage points, while participation of advantaged
students decreases by only 1.9 percentage points. This is because of our earlier nding that
disadvantaged students are more sensitive to costs, as shown in Table 3. The nested logit
model in Table A4 in Appendix again predicts similar e¤ects as the mixed logit model: there
is a slightly larger decrease of 3.6 percentage points for disadvantaged students and of 2.2
percentage points for advantaged students. In contrast, the conditional logit model in Table
A5 in Appendix strongly overpredicts the e¤ect of cost increases on the enrollment decisions,
respectively -11.6 and -6.8 percentage points.22
Given that a uniform tuition fee increase has a stronger negative impact on enrollment
of students from socially disadvantaged background, it is interesting to ask whether discrim-
inatory tuition fee increases can improve enrollment outcomes. We therefore simulate the
impact of two alternative budgetary-neutral tuition fee policies. Both policies raise tuition
fees of advantaged students by 1000 euro (as before), but at the same time implement a
subsidy to disadvantaged students in such a way that total government expenditures do not
increase. The policies di¤er in the denition of disadvantaged students who are entitled
to receive the subsidy. The rst policy grants a 1500 euro extra subsidy for low income
22Kelchtermans and Verboven (2010) also nd that the conditional logit model strongly overpredicts the
e¤ects of costs as compared with the nested logit model. Intuitively, both the mixed logit and nested logit
model incorporate unobserved heterogeneity, which allows for less restrictive substitution patters. Both
models imply that students are more sensitive to costs in their decision where and what to study than in
their participation decision. The conditional logit model instead constrains students to be equally responsive
to costs in their enrollment as in their study decision.
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students, i.e. all students who already obtain a subsidy in the status quo.23
Table 5: The impact of alternative tuition fee policies
univ acad coll prof coll total
Observed choices
all students 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
advantaged students 29.5 9.5 38.2 77.2
disadvantaged students 14.3 6.2 37.1 57.6
Mixed logit model
Status quo
all students 23.6 8.4 37.9 70.0
advantaged students 29.0 9.8 38.3 77.0
disadvantaged students 14.8 6.2 37.4 58.4
Uniform tuition fee increasea
all students -0.2 -0.2 -2.0 -2.3
advantaged students -0.2 -0.2 -1.6 -1.9
disadvantaged students -0.2 -0.2 -2.6 -3.0
Cost neutral tuition policyb with subsidy for low income students
all students -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5
advantaged students -0.2 -0.1 -1.3 -1.7
disadvantaged students +0.1 +0.1 +1.2 +1.3
Cost neutral tuition policyc with subsidy for disadvantaged students
all students -0.1 -0.0 +0.0 -0.1
advantaged students -0.2 -0.2 -1.6 -1.9
disadvantaged students +0.2 +0.2 +2.6 +3.0
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2008 high school graduates.
Outcomes of the counterfactual policies are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the
status quo.
a Tuition fee increase of 1000 euro for all students in all options in higher education.
b Subsidy of 1500 euro for low income students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for other students
c Subsidy of 1000 euro for disadvantaged students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for advantaged
students.
Table 5 shows that this policy slightly decreases total enrollment in higher education (-0.5
percentage points), but it increases enrollments of students from disadvantaged backgrounds
23We computed the maximum amount of the subsidy, rounded o¤ to 100 euro, nanced by a cost increase
of 1000 euro for high income students under the constraint that total costs for the government may not
increase. The amount of the subsidy di¤ers between the three models because of the di¤erent sensitivity to
costs.
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by 1.3 percentage points.24
The second budgetary-neutral alternative policy does not restrict subsidies to low income
students, but extends the benets to other disadvantaged students.25 Under this scenario,
more students will obtain a subsidy, so the subsidy is now limited to 1000 euro to keep total
government expenditures at the current level. This alternative policy has almost no e¤ect
on total enrollment (-0.1 percentage points), but it increases enrollment of disadvantaged
students by 3 percentage points.26 This policy therefore has a lower impact on total en-
rollment and it leads to a larger decrease in the enrollment gap between advantaged and
disadvantaged students than the rst scenario. Hence, the government may better extend
subsidies to all disadvantaged students instead of only subsidizing the low income students.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the impact of socio-economic status on enrollment and study decisions
in higher education in Flanders. Descriptive statistics show that students from socially dis-
advantaged backgrounds are less likely to participate. The participation gap is largest at
universities. We distinguish between three channels through which socio-economic status
inuences enrollment and study decisions. First, students from disadvantaged backgrounds
participate less in higher education because they are more sensitive to the costs of education.
Second, they are less likely to enroll because of lower preferences for education. This pref-
erence e¤ect captures the fact that disadvantaged students have lower tastes for education,
higher indirect costs of studying or lower expectations about the returns of the investment.
Third, students from disadvantaged backgrounds have lower academic ability when they
graduate from high school, which makes them less likely to enroll.
To empirically distinguish between these three channels, we estimated a mixed logit
model of program and institution choice for all high school graduates in Flanders in 2008.
The mixed logit model allows for unobserved heterogeneity regarding the valuation of the
study options (university versus college versus no-study) and regarding the sensitivity to
costs, which implies exible substitution patterns. We compare the results with a nested
24The e¤ects of this budget neutral policy are similar in the nested logit model with a 1400 euro subsidy
for low income students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for other students. The conditional logit model
predicts larger decreases in enrollment. Under the budget neutral scenario, the amount of the subsidy is
limited to 600 euro because this model predicts larger e¤ects of cost changes.
25Under this alternative policy, also students whose mother has no degree in high school or students who
do not speak Dutch at home obtain a subsidy.
26We nd similar e¤ects in the nested logit model but a decrease in enrollment in the conditional logit
model. In this model, the amount of the subsidy is limited to 500 euro to keep the total costs for the
government at the same level.
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logit model, where we allow for more limited correlation of the unobserved factors within
each nest, and a simple conditional logit model that forces students to be equally responsive
to costs in their enrollment as in their study decisions. We nd that it is important to
control for unobserved heterogeneity because students di¤er in their unobserved preferences
and cost sensitivity and that socio-economic status signicantly a¤ects study decisions and
the sensitivity to costs.
We then quantify the impact of the three channels through which socio-economic status
inuences enrollment in higher education. To accomplish this, we predict the study decisions
of students as if the group of disadvantaged students would have similar characteristics as
the advantaged students. Consistent with the ndings in Carneiro and Heckman (2002),
we nd that the long term e¤ects of socio-economic background, such as preferences for
education and acquired academic ability in high school, dominate the short term cost e¤ect.
The mixed logit model predicts that relaxing the three e¤ects increases total enrollment
in higher education by 8.4 percentage points. Relaxing the e¤ect on (acquired) ability
and preferences increases participation by respectively 6.5 and 1.8 percentage points, while
relaxing the cost sensitivity e¤ect leads to an increase in participation of only 0.4 percentage
points. Predictions of the nested logit model are similar but the cost sensitivity e¤ect is
larger in the conditional logit model.
Finally, we assess the impact of changes in tuition fees on enrollment. We nd that
a uniform 1000 euro tuition fee increase decreases participation by 3 percentage points for
disadvantaged students and by 1.9 percentage points for other students. Since disadvantaged
students are a¤ected more, we also assess the impact of discriminatory tuition fee increases,
where only advantaged students pay the extra 1000 euro, and disadvantaged students receive
a subsidy in such a way that total government expenditures do not increase. We nd that
extending subsidies to all disadvantaged students, instead of only subsidizing low income
students, decreases the gap in enrollment of disadvantaged students without decreasing total
participation and without increasing the costs for the government.
Our ndings have several implications for public policy. First, the low e¤ects of tuition fee
increases on enrollment (at least in a country where current fees only cover 3% of total costs)
suggest that there is room to raise tuition fees. This is especially so if they are combined with
additional subsidies to students from disadvantaged groups (broadly dened, i.e. not just
low-income groups). Such policies can help to nance higher education without increasing
the enrollment gap. Second, non-nancial policies turn out to be quantitatively much more
important to reduce the enrollment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students.
To raise enrollment of disadvantaged policies in higher education, governments should focus
on reducing the gap in high school and ensure that more pupils from disadvantaged groups
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acquire su¢ cient academic skills to enroll in higher education.
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Appendix
Table A1: Conditional logit model
no study option study options
universitya academic collegea
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant (j) 0.678*** (0.0499) -1.366*** (0.0456) -2.492*** (0.125)
Gender and high school background (j)
male 0.308*** (0.0316) 0.122*** (0.0309) 0.652*** (0.0378)
study delay 0.675*** (0.0294) -0.294*** (0.0416) -0.171*** (0.0445)
general HSb
clas + math -2.272*** (0.121) 5.519*** (0.0830) 3.083*** (0.153)
clas + lang -2.980*** (0.117) 4.369*** (0.0710) 2.598*** (0.146)
sci + math -3.291*** (0.0878) 4.382*** (0.0556) 2.989*** (0.130)
math + lang -3.686*** (0.112) 3.233*** (0.0642) 2.219*** (0.138)
eco + math -4.055*** (0.169) 3.675*** (0.0768) 2.672*** (0.145)
eco + lang -4.427*** (0.0784) 2.161*** (0.0506) 1.707*** (0.126)
human -4.331*** (0.0791) 2.098*** (0.0521) 0.817*** (0.136)
technical HSb
business -3.925*** (0.0563) 0.171 (0.138)
sci + tech -4.333*** (0.0855) 1.638*** (0.129)
social + tech -3.845*** (0.0640) -0.428** (0.169)
technics -2.199*** (0.0465) 0.225 (0.143)
other tech -2.496*** (0.0421) 0.0750 (0.142)
artistic HSb -3.265*** (0.0960) 2.788*** (0.134)
Socio-economic status (j)
mother no SE degreec 0.144*** (0.0526) -0.452*** (0.0472) -0.377*** (0.0549)
mother SE degreec 0.0206 (0.0454) -0.395*** (0.0328) -0.270*** (0.0386)
no dutch at home 0.388*** (0.0730) 0.177** (0.0690) 0.190** (0.0835)
low income 1.818*** (0.0412) -0.170*** (0.0401) 0.0791* (0.0461)
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Base category = professional college program
b Base category = technical + artistic + vocational secondary education for university, vocational
secondary education for college
c Base category = mother has a degree in higher education
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Table A1 (continued): Conditional logit model
Variables Coef. St. error
Cost sensitivity () -0.845*** (0.00576)
Cost sensitivity and socio-economic status ()
mother no SE degreec -0.134*** (0.0112)
mother SE degreec -0.0922*** (0.00849)
no dutch at home -0.152*** (0.0193)
low income -0.165*** (0.0125)
Log likelihood -125,519.7
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c Base category = mother has a degree in higher education
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Table A2: Nested logit model
no study option study options
universitya academic collegea
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
constant (j) 0.954*** (0.044) -0.348*** (0.031) -0.634*** (0.062)
Gender and high school background (j)
male 0.249*** (0.030) 0.039*** (0.009) 0.172*** (0.017)
study delay 0.590*** (0.028) -0.086*** (0.013) -0.047*** (0.012)
general HSb
clas + math -3.994*** (0.113) 1.415*** (0.117) 0.791*** (0.076)
clas + lang -3.990*** (0.110) 1.122*** (0.093) 0.669*** (0.067)
sci + math -4.300*** (0.086) 1.123*** (0.092) 0.766*** (0.071)
math + lang -4.158*** (0.107) 0.828*** (0.069) 0.569*** (0.059)
eco + math -4.695*** (0.162) 0.943*** (0.079) 0.686*** (0.068)
eco + lang -4.483*** (0.075) 0.554*** (0.047) 0.438*** (0.049)
human -4.312*** (0.075) 0.542*** (0.046) 0.214*** (0.039)
technical HSb
business -3.669*** (0.053) 0.044 (0.035)
sci + tech -4.137*** (0.081) 0.419*** (0.048)
social + tech -3.541*** (0.061) -0.105** (0.044)
technics -1.998*** (0.044) 0.058 (0.037)
other tech -2.349*** (0.040) 0.015 (0.036)
artistic HSb -3.434*** (0.089) 0.716*** (0.068)
Socio-economic status (j)
mother no SE degreec 0.435*** (0.041) -0.138*** (0.016) -0.110*** (0.016)
mother SE degreec 0.293*** (0.036) -0.109*** (0.012) -0.075*** (0.012)
no dutch at home 0.257*** (0.061) 0.138*** (0.020) 0.097*** (0.023)
low income 0.283*** (0.052) -0.059*** (0.011) 0.014 (0.012)
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Base category = professional college program
b Base category = technical + artistic + vocational secondary education for university, vocational
secondary education for college
c Base category = mother has a degree in higher education
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Table A2 (continued): Nested logit model
Variables Coef. St. error
Cost sensitivity () -0.219*** (0.018)
Cost sensitivity and socio-economic status ()
mother no SE degreec -0.046*** (0.005)
mother SE degreec -0.033*** (0.004)
no dutch at home -0.023*** (0.006)
low income -0.080*** (0.007)
Nesting parameter () 0.254*** (0.021)
Log likelihood -124435.07
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
c Base category = mother has a degree in higher education
Table A3: Relaxing the impact of socio-economic background
univ acad coll prof coll total
Observed choices 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
Conditional logit model
Status quo 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
Relaxing the impact of socio-economic background
Cost e¤ect +0.1 +0.1 +1.2 +1.4
Preference e¤ect +1.1 +0.3 +3.3 +4.7
Ability e¤ect +4.7 +1.1 +0.9 +6.6
All e¤ects +6.4 +1.4 +3.1 +10.9
Nested logit model
Status quo 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
Relaxing the impact of socio-economic background
Cost e¤ect +0.0 +0.1 +0.5 +0.5
Preference e¤ect +0.8 +0.2 +0.5 +1.5
Ability e¤ect +4.7 +1.1 +0.9 +6.5
All e¤ects +6.2 +1.2 +1.2 +8.6
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2008 high school graduates.
The e¤ects of the counterfactuals are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the predicted
choice probabilities
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Table A4: The impact of alternative tuition fee policies
univ acad coll prof coll total
Observed choices
all students 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
advantaged students 29.5 9.5 38.2 77.2
disadvantaged students 14.3 6.2 37.1 57.6
Nested logit model
Status quo
all students 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
advantaged students 29.3 9.5 37.9 75.4
disadvantaged students 14.7 6.2 37.6 58.5
Uniform tuition fee increasea
all students -0.3 -0.2 -2.2 -2.8
advantaged students -0.3 -0.2 -1.7 -2.3
disadvantaged students -0.4 -0.3 -3.0 -3.6
Cost neutral tuition policyb with subsidy for low income students
all students -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7
advantaged students -0.3 -0.2 -1.5 -2.0
disadvantaged students +0.1 +0.1 +2.5 +2.7
Redistributive tuition fee policyb
all students -0.1 -0.0 +0.1 -0.1
advantaged students -0.3 -0.2 -1.7 -2.3
disadvantaged students +0.3 +0.2 +3.0 +3.6
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2008 high school graduates.
Outcomes of the counterfactual policies are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the
status quo.
a Tuition fee increase of 1000 euro for all students in all options in higher education.
b Subsidy of 1400 euro for low income students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for other students
c Subsidy of 1000 euro for disadvantaged students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for advantaged
students.
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Table A5: The impact of alternative tuition fee policies
univ acad coll prof coll total
Observed choices
all students 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
advantaged students 29.5 9.5 38.2 77.2
disadvantaged students 14.3 6.2 37.1 57.6
Conditional logit model
Status quo
all students 23.8 8.3 37.8 69.8
advantaged students 29.4 9.6 38.0 77.0
disadvantaged students 14.6 6.2 37.5 58.3
Uniform tuition fee increasea
all students -1.4 -0.9 -7.4 -9.7
advantaged students -1.5 -0.8 -6.2 -8.5
disadvantaged students -1.4 -1.0 -9.4 -11.8
Cost neutral tuition policyb with subsidy for low income students
all students -1.1 -0.6 -4.0 -5.6
advantaged students -1.4 -0.8 -6.0 -8.2
disadvantaged students -0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -1.3
Cost neutral tuition policyc with subsidy for disadvantaged students
all students -0.7 -0.4 -2.0 -3.1
advantaged students -1.5 -0.8 -6.2 -8.5
disadvantaged students +0.5 +0.4 +4.9 +5.8
Note: Observed and predicted outcomes are expressed as percentages of 2008 high school graduates.
Outcomes of the counterfactual policies are expressed as percentage point changes relative to the
status quo.
a Tuition fee increase of 1000 euro for all students in all options in higher education.
b Subsidy of 600 euro for low income students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for other students.
c Subsidy of 500 euro for disadvantaged students nanced by a 1000 euro cost increase for advantaged
students.
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